Social Banditry, Myth and Historical Reality : Conceptualising Contemporary Albanian Organised Crime Against the Hajduks by Gustafson, Oskar
   
SOCIAL BANDITRY, MYTH 
AND HISTORICAL REALITY  
CONCEPTUALISING CONTEMPORARY ALBANIAN 
ORGANISED CRIME AGAINST THE HAJDUKS 
Oskar Gustafson 
 
Master of Arts in European Studies 
Advisor: Tomas Sniegon 
                                                                  Submitted: May 2017 
 
 
Abstract  
This thesis will investigate how Erik Hobsbawm’s theory of ‘social banditry’ can be applied 
to a contemporary setting to explain the strength and workings of ethnic Albanian organised 
crime groups.  
The paper will delve into a pre-existing debate surrounding the effectiveness of this 
theoretical lens as a method to account for the global phenomenon of banditry (particularly 
in the feudalist age). ‘Social banditry’ occurs at times of great social upheaval and distress, 
when unofficial protagonists manage to wedge themselves into the socio-political 
framework. Therefore, taking a historical perspective, the research will identify episodes in 
Albania’s past where the phenomenon has had the opportunity to occur, beginning with 
banditry in the late eighteenth century. The debate around ‘social banditry’ will bring 
together significant theoretical approaches with sociological, psychological and empirical 
reasoning. Given the humanist standpoint of this subject area, the paper will uncover 
powerful motivators such as honour, nobility and moral justification. It will also analyse how 
ancient cultural norms continue to cloak immoral criminal actions denoting them as 
expressions of national pride or personal honour.  
In a nation that is looking towards EU accession, this study will present an understanding of 
what is its most significant road block – that of organised crime.  
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Introduction   
Background  
If we view crime in absolute terms and measure it by our western notions of legality and 
justice when assessing what is right or wrong, we limit our capacity to respond to the issue. 
Any national or transnational attempt at stemming the issue requires a deeper understanding 
of the sociological impacts of organised crime, both in terms of those who are drawn to it 
and those who feel its impact. Rationalising human behaviour and contextualising socio-
economic and cultural conditions can lead us to better comprehend how and why organised 
criminal networks can achieve such prominence in certain spheres. The seminal study of 
Erik Hobsbawm, who brought the term ‘social bandits’ into the wider debate around the 
phenomena of brigandry and banditry, is reflective of just such a rethinking.1 It can be read 
as a historian’s attempt to rationalise the hero and myth status that surrounded these 
‘outlaws’, and led Hobsbawm to declare banditry as an expression of revolt amongst the 
peasantry. The theory caused much controversy when it was first publicised and many 
counter arguments were put forward. Nevertheless, the controversy triggered a very 
important movement in academia to better understand the sociological impact and meaning 
of criminality.   
Although there are very clear and practical differences between the bandits of the pre-
capitalist age and the organised criminal networks of today, there is good reasoning to apply 
a similar theoretical lens to a study of contemporary criminality. Firstly, it is extremely 
important to apply a humanist perspective when trying to understand the appeal and 
development of criminal activity, as one starts to uncover powerful motivators and notions 
of nobility, moral justification and normalisation. Secondly, the concept of ‘social banditry’ 
(as an expression of peasant revolt), occurs at times of great social upheaval and distress (see 
Chapter 1).2 Unofficial actors vie for power and cement themselves within the economic 
framework of society and this, I will argue, is not limited to the feudal past and can occur 
whenever a state is drastically weakened. The debate around ‘social banditry’ brings together 
significant theoretical approaches with sociological, psychological and empirical reasoning. 
                                                          
1 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (The New Press; Rev Sub edition, 1969; repr., 2000). 
2 Jan Whitaker, "Review: Bandits (Revised Edition) by E.J. Hobsbawm," Mid-American Review of Sociology 7, 
no. 1 (1982). 
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Criminal activity can often blend into legitimate activity or even take on the guise of ‘just 
behaviour’.  When a country is within a grip of civil war for instance, certain groups must 
seek alternate ways of supporting themselves outside of the official channels, as the 
government may be actively working as a suppressive unrepresentative power holder. Those 
acting against the government, whether it be by smuggling weapons or supplies to anti-state 
elements, would be seen as taking criminal action. It is during times of crisis that pre-existing 
criminal networks come to the fore and offer much needed alternative sources of income and 
are, arguably falsely, commended as the defenders of the people. 
To contextualise this issue, I will be taking Albania as a case study. The country, which has 
experienced severe problems with organised crime, has been a candidate member of the 
European Union (EU) since 2003. Although it was granted visa-free status in 2010, it 
continues to be kept at arm’s length.3 The most significant roadblock to accession for 
Albania are problems with corruption and organised crime. These issues have persisted in 
plaguing the potential economic development of the nation which is in desperate need of 
democratic reform. Until they are properly tackled, the country will find itself continually 
pushed back from real progress in the EU accession process. 
I wish to determine what reasons account for the draw of ethnic Albanians towards the 
‘alternative economy’ and explain the strength of their networks both in Albania, Kosovo 
and amongst diaspora communities. To give more thorough insight and to uncover the 
relevance of the ‘social bandit’ debate, I intend to apply a historical perspective. This 
approach aims to connect the drivers behind organised crime amongst the Albanian people, 
from the ’hajduks’4 (bandits common in the seventeenth century) to modern-day narcotics 
and human trafficking. I will discuss social frameworks such as the ancestral code of the 
‘Kanun’5 which has governed rural life in Albania for five centuries and still holds sway, 
particularly in the mountainous north. This law is known as the ‘religion of blood’, of which 
feuding and vendettas are viewed as central rights. The exploration of this historical context 
will hopefully demonstrate what distinctive cultural attachments there are to the Albanian 
criminal economy and what has led to its current political and economic instability.  
                                                          
3 European Commission, "Albania 2016 Report " (ec.europa.eu2016). 
4 Hajduk is a term most commonly referring to outlaws, brigands, highwaymen or freedom fighters in 
Southeastern Europe, and parts of Central and Eastern Europe. They were particularly active during the 
reign of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. 
5 A set of traditional laws first codified in the fifteenth century with its origins in central Albania and 
surrounding regions of Southeastern Europe (See Chapter 7 for more details)  
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The ‘social bandit’ theory explores the myths and legends around outlaws and touches upon 
elements of justification and honour. The aspect of justification is very important because if 
the perpetrator does not consider his/her actions to be criminal or that they can be defended 
by context, then we are defining this person as a ‘criminal’ simply from the perspective of 
state law that claims jurisdiction where they live. As will be touched upon in the following 
chapters, it is important to note that Albania has suffered a long history of political 
subjugation by foreign imperial powers as well as mismanagement by corrupt domestic 
leaders, which has left a deep scar on social norms and expectations. This is particularly the 
case when it comes to trust in state authorities. A 2015 survey conducted in Tirana, showed 
that more than 50 per cent of the population distrusts the judicial process and only a third of 
the population trusts in public institutions.6 Perception of corruption is a large factor in these 
concerning figures. When the state government lacks legitimacy, it simply becomes an 
unrepresentative power and citizens will instead look inward for their bases of trust and 
affinity. 
Through utilising the theory of ‘social banditry’, I hope to dissect the workings of ethnic 
Albanian organised crime networks and get a better picture as to why the country is 
struggling to let go of black market ties in favour of EU membership. My research question 
for this study will be the following: Can Erik Hobsbawm’s theory of ‘social banditry’ be 
applied to a modern setting, to better understand the strength and conduct of ethnic Albanian 
organised crime networks? 
The reason I have chosen this research question is because I believe it will help uncover why 
Albania is holding on to ancient codes that are completely offset to modern democratic laws. 
‘Social banditry’ appears at times of social upheaval and when the state displays illegitimate 
representation towards its people. As I will explain in further detail below, Albania has gone 
through this experience. Using the Marxist theory of ‘social banditry’ against the modern 
setting of Albania will not produce the same type of debate that Hobsbawm brought to the 
field, regarding the bandits of feudalist societies. However, it may help reveal unique 
sociological behaviors that are not necessarily evident if one uses, for instance, a political 
science approach to understanding a phenomenon as complex as organised crime.   
                                                          
6Erisa Lame & Aleka Papa, "Opinion Poll - Trust in Government " (www.idmalbania.org: Institute for 
Democracy and Mediation 2015). 
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I am aware of the paradox of using Hobsbawm’s theory in a post-Marxist society, however, 
I believe there are strong elements that come out of the ‘social banditry’ theory that can be 
applied to the sociological environment there today. Methods of moral justification, 
garnering public support based on honour and tradition, evidence of pariah communities, 
(see Chapter 2) all show working reflections to the arguments Hobsbawm put forward with 
this theoretical lens. Furthermore, the country has only recently come out of a communist 
regime, there is fresh history of corruption and an understandable lack of trust in the state. 
The international agreement that lead to the creation of Kosovo (which has strong ethnic ties 
to Albanians) for instance has been labelled ‘Pax Mafiosa’ (See Chapter 2) by certain 
commentators. Therefore, it seems relevant to apply a theory that argues for the social 
acceptance and at times support of criminality. For as Hobsbawm argues, it doesn’t matter if 
the ‘social bandit’ existed in literal terms, the important aspect is the belief that he/she 
somehow could, which bandits and criminals alike, invariably use to their advantage.  
 
Thesis Structure  
Before delving into my research, I believe it is necessary to discuss the wider debate around 
my research question and state why this is an important issue to debate today. I will therefore 
begin with a section to contextualise the issue which will discuss the EU accession process 
and the great hindrance that organised crime has on Albania’s road to membership. To ensure 
that I apply my research question correctly, I will then set out my approach as well as making 
clear the boundaries of my research. 
In chapter one I will conduct a thorough literature review of Hobsbawm’s concept of ‘social 
bandits’ and debate the strengths and limitations of his theory. This chapter will also feature 
a description of the integral relationship of the state and its citizens as a cause for the 
formation of criminal enterprises and bandits. Understanding this important aspect will give 
a clearer insight into how banditry and modern organised crime can be effectively compared; 
For if a state acts in an extractive or unrepresentative manner, segments of the population 
can look to unofficial protagonists (i.e. bandits) for support, capital and perhaps even a sense 
of affinity. Even if these exponents actions are not based on legal grounds they can still 
represent a force of moral code.  
In order to frame the use of ‘social banditry’ as an analysis of the contemporary organised 
crime scene amongst ethnic Albanians, it will be necessary to explore where the term was 
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first applied in this region. The second chapter will therefore make up a chronological 
journey of modern Albania starting with a more in depth analysis of the hajduks and their 
particular social influence amongst ethnic Albanians living under Ottoman rule in the late 
eighteenth century. The rest of this chapter will make up the main analysis of the strength 
and significance of ethnic Albanian criminality in a modern context. Applying Hobsbawm’s 
theory to the analysis, it will be here that I explore the recent history of the nation and pin 
point moments of social crisis where these unofficial protagonists have been able to assert 
their influence.  
In the third chapter I will postulate how the influence of ancient cultural norms have cloaked 
criminal actions of such groups and encouraged them to act with a vindicated authority. The 
principles of justification and ‘myth making’ will also be taken into account in the 
comparison of ‘social banditry’. In the discussion of my research findings and the 
conclusion, I will summarise and analyse the results stemming from my research question 
whilst arguing how far the theoretical lens of ‘social banditry’ proves beneficial to the 
understanding of modern organised crime amongst ethnic Albanians. In addition, how the 
theory could be applied to other examples.  
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Contextualisation 
The Lighthouse of EU Accession 
The EU accession process is part of the effort to foster peace, cooperation and economic 
growth in Europe. Applicant states are being encouraged to adopt laws that reflect European 
values, in exchange for the promise of membership to the EU. The European Commission 
encourages reforms promoting good governance and rule of law by promising incentives 
such as visa liberalisation along the road to accession. Aside from the prestige that closeness 
to the EU brings, there are huge economic and political motivations for the accession states. 
However, questions are being raised by EU members about the enlargement process and the 
difficulties of incorporating new nations. These narratives pivot on whether, in certain 
accession states, there truly exists a belief to take on the democratic principles which 
complement the grander normative influence of the EU, or whether it is simply a case of 
applicant states meeting the criteria pro forma for the financial gain of closer cooperation. 
Especially when these application nations have very recent histories of internal conflict and 
economic instability. In no context is this question being more fervently raised than in that 
of organised crime containment. 
Countries on Europe’s periphery are potential gateways for illicit goods and whilst some 
nations are more proactive than others in taking advantage of this ‘alternative economy’ 
(black market), the European response is directed at stemming its impact. International 
bodies such as Europol, Interpol and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) are helping to tackle the issues pragmatically through intelligence sharing, 
extradition management, and cross-border police collaboration. However, real progress can 
be difficult, since nations can often jealousy guard their judicial and policing authorities and 
are quick to limit cooperation with other states or international unions should they start 
‘infringing’ on matters of sovereign concern. 
Fighting crime is never as simple as merely closing borders. Criminals invariably appear 
whenever and wherever there are opportunities. Effectively tackling organised crime 
requires a nuanced approach. Indeed, the accession agreements require partner nations to 
reduce organised crime and corruption in their home state. A carrot and stick approach 
encourages states to reform whilst securing their interests in the European economic sphere. 
In the long run, this strategy could lead to an improvement in law and order, not only in the 
accession state but in the EU as a whole. 
7 
 
To properly assess the full impact of criminal networks in Europe, it is necessary to 
understand what constitutes organised crime and what types of individuals operate within 
the ‘black-market’. To do so, it is beneficial to gain a deeper understanding of civil society’s 
connection to the illicit economy, as there are major grey areas between the activities of the 
state and criminal syndicates, especially in economically weaker states. In many cases, 
should the state come to be viewed as lacking legitimacy, due to weak institutions, ineffectual 
governance or some other failing, such as outright hostility to the population or some sub-
group thereof, organised crime networks can fill the vacuum. In some cases, they have been 
known to become a kind of alternative administration or government, serving as the 
guarantor of prosperity and security. 
  
The Stolen Oars 
Since 2003, Albania has been partaking in accession negotiations and agreements to progress 
towards candidate status in the EU. However, steps towards full membership are currently 
hindered by the country’s pressing issues with organised crime and need for political reform. 
Various reports have indicated that between 70-80 per cent of heroin distributed in Europe 
is under the control of Albanian organisations, a really impressive percentage for a nation of 
just six million people. 7  A UNODC report showed that between 2000-2008 Albanian 
nationals made up 32 per cent of the total arrests associated with the trafficking and 
distribution of heroin in Italy. This was far bigger than any other ethnic group with only 
Turkish nationals following at 14 per cent, yet the country has thirteen times the population 
of Albania. Convicted Italian nationals followed in at 10 per cent, which is a surprising 
distribution of statistics when one considers the strength of Italian mafia groups such as the 
Camorra and the Sicilian Mafia.8 
According to the 2016 EU Drug Markets Report, which concerns both the production and 
smuggling of narcotic substances, Albania is the main trafficking route of heroin into 
Europe.9 When one looks at the diaspora of ethnic Albanian communities around major 
                                                          
7Palash Ghosh, "Tip of the Iceberg: French Police Arrest Albanian Heroin Traffickers, but Balkan Criminal 
Gangs Tighten Grip across Europe,"  (2012), http://www.ibtimes.com/tip-iceberg-french-police-arrest-
albanian-heroin-traffickers-balkan-criminal-gangs-tighten-grip. 
8UNODC, "Addiction, Crime and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium," 
(http://www.unodc.org2009), 123. 
9European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) and Europol, "Eu Drug Markets 
Report - in-Depth Analysis," (www.emcdda.europa.eu2016). 
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European cities, we are seeing an ever-increasing involvement and control of the black 
market by those sharing this heritage. Furthermore, despite eradication efforts in 2014, 
cannabis production continues to prove a huge hindrance to Albania’s democratic legitimacy. 
Controlled by organised criminal networks, the production amounts to five billion US 
Dollars. To put that in perspective that’s almost half of Albania’s GDP, coursing through the 
veins of the illicit market.10 
Albania’s geographical position, the Kosovo war, the absence of a state of law and the lack 
of remedies needed for fighting organised crime have turned the nation into arguably the 
principal gateway for the illegal trade from East to West.11 According to Transparency 
International, 80 per cent of the Albanian economy is a ‘parallel’ one, meaning that for every 
hundred euros of registered capital, another eighty euros is never officially accounted for. It 
is safe to assume that the majority of this undocumented capital comes from organised 
crime.12 
Generally speaking, Southeast Europe has always been a fertile ground on which organised 
crime can flourish. Geographically, the Balkan states are at the gateway between Western 
Europe and the East. To the east, Turkey is the route to the Middle East and Asia beyond. To 
the west, the Western Balkans shares the Adriatic coast with Italy and Greece. Inland, it 
shares borders with five EU members. The Asian routes of South American cocaine to West 
Europe also run through the Balkans and a majority of Afghan heroin follows the old Silk 
Road from Turkey across the Balkans to Western Europe.13 
Moreover, the existing strength of illegality and black market activity in Southeast Europe 
acts as an ever-consolidating cycle for EU-based organised crime groups to launder their 
proceeds. 14  In contrast with many Eastern European countries, which experienced 
democratic transformation in the late 1980s, events in Southeast Europe have often been 
hampered by war and ethnic conflict. The various Balkan wars, poverty, political upheaval 
                                                          
10Linda Pressly, "Europe's Outdoor Cannabis Capital,"  (2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
38111945. 
11Check United National Development Program report – Albanian Human Development 
12Marsida Nence, "Corruption, Albania’s Biggest Challenge for Integration in E.U.,"  (2013), 
http://www.pecob.eu/Corruption-Albania-biggest-challenge-integration-E-U. 
13UNODC, "Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational 
Organised Crimes," (www.unodc.org2011). 
14EUROPOL, "Annual Report," (www.europol.europa.eu2008). 
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and break-up of states have provided opportunities for organised crime to seep into the 
internal workings of the Balkan states. 15 
There are important elements that come into defining the strength and persistence of crime, 
that are shaped by both experience and interpretation. This means that identifiable criminal 
traits can at times display particularly unique cultural nuances that are worth evaluating when 
wishing to tackle the issue.  
Albanian society is often portrayed, in blanket terms, as violent and subject to criminality 
because of harsh cultural norms.16 Within Albania, Kosovo and their respective diasporas, 
the labelling of violence, both officially and unofficially, is often made (but not necessarily 
understood) from a Western perspective. There has been a widely-shared view among 
scholars, policy makers and law enforcement practitioners that in these Balkan countries 
illegality and violence are widespread either because of poor governance, terrible economic 
conditions or ‘culture’.17 This stereotyping arouses both fear and suspicion against ethnic 
Albanian communities and whilst there may indeed be cultural factors driving criminal 
activity, it is important to abstain from myopic reasoning and delve deeper into the real 
workings of the phenomenon. 
Therefore, whilst I intend to apply a historical lens to this issue I must stress that I do not 
intend to argue for a gradual cultural conditioning to crime. Applying any such brash identity 
markers to criminal groups can be misleading and counterproductive. Criminal groups are 
by their nature, selective about their membership. However, to assert that there is a common 
identity amongst criminal networks would be detrimental to any effective attempt to 
understand their operations. Criminal networks are run as short-term gain businesses without 
any restricting codes of ethics. If a division of a criminal network becomes weak or 
unprofitable, it will be ruthlessly cut down by another faction ready to seize the 
opportunity. 18  The romanticised portrayal of the Sicilian mafia in popular film, with 
                                                          
15Fabian Zhilla, "Organised Crime and Judicial Corruption in the Western Balkans : Are Customary Norms 
Playing Any Role&Quest," Journal of Financial Crime, no. 4 (2011). 
16Jana Arsovska and Philippe Verduyn, "Globalization, Conduct Norms and Culture Conflict: Perceptions of 
Violence and Crime in an Ethnic Albanian Context [Article]," (2008), 226. 
17Jana Arsovska, "Social Confusion on the Road to Modernity: The Meaning of Violence and Crime in Ethnic 
Albanian Context " (CERGE-EI GDN Project 2007). 
18 R. Saviano, Gomorrah (Pan Macmillan, 2008). 
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references to brotherhood and an honour amongst thieves doesn’t usually match up to the 
cold-hearted business operation of the criminal underworld.19 
That being said, a common identity can contribute to the makeup of certain criminal 
networks. Albanian criminal networks for instance are found across the world. Although 
there is no central operational base which we could refer to as ‘the Albanian Mafia’, there is 
a distinct closed ethnic affiliation that occurs throughout. This is probably due to the practical 
reasons of sharing a language and socio-cultural background. 
Whether political circumstances, economic insecurity or a ‘culture of violence’ is to be 
blame, until Albania manages to gain its ability to steer the democratic course laid down by 
the EU accession process it will haplessly drift into rocky waters where criminal networks 
and corrupt officials take full advantage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 R. Saviano, Gomorrah (Pan Macmillan, 2008). 
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Methodology 
As a Master thesis in European Studies with a humanistic profile, this paper will make use 
of concepts, theories and models from various fields of thought. The topic will span from 
identity issues to matters of law and order, so it will therefore be necessary to take a 
multidisciplinary approach and include sources from history, social sciences, political 
science as well as criminology. The aim is to provide an extensive yet nuanced insight into 
the world of banditry and organised crime, a subject area fraught with stereotypes, 
generalisations and lack of empirical research. 
In order to frame the question of how cultural narratives and contextual reasoning connect 
modern organised crime in Albania to the hajduks of centuries past, it will be necessary to 
review the existing literature. Principally that of Eric Hobsbawm, who coined the term 
‘social bandit’ and is responsible for sparking the debate. Following this literature review, I 
intend to analyse how far the discussion over the sociological role of the bandit can be 
applied to modern day criminal networks operating in the black market. With Albania as a 
case study, I will digest the idea of a criminal career, being an 'alternative profession', 
demonstrated by political rebuke or self-vindicated honour. Furthermore, I will examine how 
the criminal underworld is perceived by both the state and the population as a whole. 
It is often argued that organised crime is a topic beyond objective measure since it is 
extremely difficult to conduct reliable empirical research on a phenomenon shrouded in 
secrecy and backed up by violence. There is no doubt that sharing information about the 
criminal underworld, especially to the point of publication is hindered by the legitimate fear 
of reprisal. Only rarely can law enforcement officers and professional researchers observe 
the activities of a criminal group directly. Even if it were feasible to interview offenders for 
the purposes of this research, I believe one would need to remain sceptical as to the reliability 
and validity of the information gleaned. 
Aside from the odd outstanding case it is almost impossible to learn about the internal 
dynamics of a contemporary criminal organisation. Therefore, social scientists are forced to 
rely on accounts supplied by police, judicial authorities, the media, and reports from key 
witnesses. However, this can also be full of pitfalls. Authorities are reluctant to release 
information without the threat of legal reprisal, and victims are often reluctant to speak up 
for fear of retribution. Furthermore, as collaborators in the judicial process, police informants 
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are often entitled to protection and a reduction in their sentencing, which might affect the 
authenticity of their testimonies. 
When reaching for conclusions, this thesis will utilise data from previous academic research, 
official judicial and legal authorities (Europol, UNODC etc.) and respected media sources. 
The most comprehensive study of the phenomenon of organised crime in Albania is the work 
of Sociologists Jana Arsovska, principally in her book; ‘Decoding Albanian Organized 
Crime: Culture, Politics, and Globalization’. Her writings are based on over ten years of 
research, which includes interviews with Albanian citizens, law enforcements agencies, 
criminals themselves; as well as police reports and court cases from several different 
countries where Albanian diasporas are found. Given the depth of empirical research backing 
her conclusions I will be utilising this study’s considerable level of analysis when building 
my own arguments. 
The method used to effectively answer my research question will be based on triangulation 
- combining and applying several studies and research findings considering the same 
phenomenon. The purpose is to obtain a nuanced understanding about the myths and noble 
justifications surrounding criminal activity by comparing different perspectives. As it is only 
through studying multiple observers, theories, and empirical materials, that one can hope to 
overcome the intrinsic biases linked to single-method studies often found in the subject area 
of crime. 
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Chapter 1 - Conceptualising the Social Bandit 
The Infamous or the Legendary?  
Bandits populate the myths and legends of the lands of the Western Balkans and the 
Mediterranean Sea. They have been referred to under many different titles depending on 
societal interpretations and regional origins. From collective groupings, such as; brigands, 
mountain warriors, pirates and irregular soldiers, to more distinguishable ethnic groups such 
as; Hajduks, Klephts20 and Uskoks21. Very often those who partook in banditry in this region 
have fallen into legend, often under the guise of saviours of the common people against 
tyranny. Much of the glorification of banditry and ‘Robin Hood’ myths (taking from the rich 
to give to the poor) are put forward by historians with romantic notions of a people struggling 
against the domination of a large Empire. These academics or intellectuals often either have 
strong nationalist sentiments or wish to highlight the struggle of ‘European peoples’ against 
‘invaders’ from the East. 
‘Mafias’ (the often-over-romanticised type of organised criminal network), with their 
characteristic blend of ruthlessness, secrecy and codes of honour, have also worked their 
way into the collective consciousness, producing conflicting feelings of rejection, 
fascination and admiration. They have been romanticised, and at the same time represented 
as aberrant (and abhorrent) protagonists on the margins of society.  
The need to generate and perpetuate the noble robber, the good thief, or the social 
bandit is found in cultures around the world. Despite many local adaptations and 
inflections, at the core of the facts and fictions surrounding outlaw heroes remains 
the belief that he, or very occasionally she, robs the rich to give to the poor. The hope 
for a better world—however defined—continues to play a significant role in global 
politics, economy, and culture. By making use of an existing narrative framework, 
within which is embedded a crude but often effective moral code, the celebrated 
outlaw, his sympathizers, and his oppressors appear to act out a cultural script with 
their roles pre-determined by the tradition. This script almost inevitably leads to a 
bloody denouement. The dead hero then develops an afterlife that feeds back into the 
                                                          
20 Klephts were highwaymen turned self-appointed brigands, anti-Ottoman insurgents, and warlike 
mountain-folk who lived in the countryside when Greece was a part of the Ottoman Empire 
21 Uskoks were irregular soldiers in Habsburg Croatia that inhabited areas on the eastern Adriatic coast and 
surrounding territories during the Ottoman wars in Europe. 
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tradition, both keeping the legend alive and providing the basis for the heroization 
of the next individual to raise a sword, bow, or gun against an oppressive power.22 
A bandit is an individual who methodically acquires capital through the process of robbing 
others, typically within a gang or an organisation that distributes wealth within its own 
internal structure.23 Nevertheless, throughout the world, bandits have been aided, sheltered, 
praised, and immortalised in stories, songs and folklore by the very same social classes that 
are most vulnerable to them. The very same phenomenon occurs with organised criminal 
networks or mafias. Whether it is through fear of reprisal or a general contempt for the ruling 
establishment, many ordinary citizens venerate these individuals operating outside the law 
as brave vanguards of their communities, representing the struggle of the persecuted and 
downtrodden. 
Herein lies the polarisation of the historical debate on the position of the bandit’s role in 
society. Although ‘Robin Hood’ type myths have existed since time immemorial, it was Eric 
Hobsbawm in his book ‘Bandits’ (1969) who first framed the concept of the ‘social bandit’ 
and called into question the sociological puzzle of the ‘hero’ status these criminals received. 
Hobsbawm provides an explanation for the positive reception of bandits based upon Marxian 
class analysis. He suggests that ‘social banditry’ is an early manifestation of proletarian 
protest at the exploitation of the ruling classes.24 
In the mountains and forests bands of armed and violent men outside the range of 
law, impose their will by extortion, robbery or otherwise on their victims. In doing 
so, banditry simultaneously challenges the economic, social and political order by 
challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, law and the control of resources.25 
According to Hobsbawm, while all those operating in banditry are considered criminals by 
the elites, ‘social bandits’ are revered by the members of the exploited peasant classes from 
which they are drawn. ‘Social banditry’, in contrast to ordinary banditry is characterised by 
a supportive relationship between the peasant population and the bandits. He describes them 
as ‘peasant outlaws’, who are; “considered by their people as heroes, as champions, 
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avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation.” 26  This relationship 
sometimes plants the seeds of more substantial peasant resistance against the oppression of 
the ruling classes. 
However, this view is rebuked by many other historians, sociologists and political scientists 
who argue that this glorifies and romanticises the role of the bandit in society (Aton Blok, 
John S. Koliopoulos, Paul Sant Cassia etc.) They contend that any benefit the bandit brings 
the lower classes is purely through cause and effect rather than any honourable intention. 
Bandits of centuries past, just like criminal networks of today, were focussed on their own 
self-interests. Of course, this could unintentionally bring benefits to their local communities, 
especially when a particularly oppressive or unrepresentative ruling class was in power. One 
such historian was Anton Block, who argued; “rather than actual champions of the poor and 
weak, bandits quite often terrorised those from whose very ranks they managed to rise, and 
thus helped to supress them.”27 
This reproach or rebuke against Hobsbawm’s conceptual idea, often comes in the form of 
rationalist choice theory, a method which many political scientists, economists and 
criminologists favour. The basic premise is that the hero and myth status of bandits exists 
only in legends and folklore, not in accurate historical representation. Many conclude that 
real-life heroic bandits are a myth. The image of the heroic bandit emanates from the 
collective imagination of later generations, who look back and romanticise legendary 
characters from the past. 
Historians Roumen Daskalov and Alexander Vezenkov in their book ’Entangled Histories 
of the Balkans’, describe the popularity of the heroic bandit narratives which were 
particularly prevalent within nineteenth century literature. In Albania especially, the concept 
of the ‘social bandit’ has taken on mythical proportions. They argue how, once the Balkans 
fell under Ottoman control, this discourse continued in the heroic-tragic vein, focusing 
almost entirely on resistance to Ottoman occupation. The theme of the hero rebelling against 
injustice, taking up arms and heading for the mountains to fight the enemy, enjoys 
extraordinary popularity.28 
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Graham Seal, a professor of folklore, was an adherent of Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit’ theory, 
professing that the historian was correct in identifying outlaw heroes as a different and 
special form of criminal, regardless of attempts to portray many such figures as common 
thugs. Seal believes that while criticism of Hobsbawm’s grouping may be necessary, it is 
often overlooked that large numbers of local people have considered such individuals to be 
‘Robin Hoods’, both during and after their lifetimes. 29 
What is clear, is that outlaw heroes arise from within an ethnic, national, or other cultural 
groupings, serving as a symbol of resistance to perceived oppression. The apparent cultural 
principle is that wherever there are significant numbers of people who believe they are the 
victims of inequity, injustice, and oppression, historical and/or fictional outlaw heroes will 
appear and continue to be celebrated after their deaths. 
The debate about the existence of the ‘social bandit’, or the idea of the outlaw hero, has led 
to a contentious split in historical and sociological thinking. Hobsbawm has progressively 
refined and modified his original 1969 thesis, directly responding to his critics. However, 
the debate goes on. In the following subsections, I will be analysing the ‘social bandit’ debate 
to assert its validity as a theoretical tool and seeing how far it can be applied to the accounts 
of the ‘heroic’ Albanian Hajduks or mountain brigands of the North (Chapter 2). It will be 
necessary to criticise the often popular but over romanticised legends of ‘noble banditry’ but 
also to discuss the limitations of the rationalist choice approach which does not often account 
for the sociological impacts of banditry on the affected population. It is important to 
remember that the interpretations of history are never simply factual, they are influenced 
heavily by current social and political frameworks as well as the sentiments of the interpreter. 
However, to determine that this somehow makes such accounts less ‘historically accurate’, 
perhaps belittles the validity of history as a method of how humans interpret or choose to 
remember events. 
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The Debate on Hobsbawm’s Theory  
Hobsbawm is one of the most widely read, influential and respected British theorists and 
historians in the Marxist tradition. His impact on the interpretation and shaping of history is 
not to be underestimated. However, although many academics will continue to refer to him 
as a Marxist, he made clear the limits of the political ideology and firmly understood its 
limitations during the time of capitalism. He had long since abandoned all pretence to defend 
socialism and had accepted capitalism as an established fact of life that may be regrettable 
but impossible to replace.30 
That being said, there are clear Marxist motives in his writings and when it comes to his 
explanation of the existence of banditry, it is not hard to find parallels in his description of 
the struggle of the peasants within a feudalist system to the struggle of the lower classes 
against the ruthlessness of capitalism in more modern periods of history found in his other 
works. He saw banditry as a direct result of an oppressive system that fed on the poor and 
feudalism itself as the foundation of capitalism. Hence those choosing to embrace banditry 
could become noble heroes, vanguards of the redistribution of wealth, the defenders of the 
local population against the horrors of an extractive system exploiting the weak and 
benefiting the nobility. This is of course a very suggestive evaluation of his writings, but it 
does go some way towards understanding his concept of the ‘social bandit’. 
In a field of study notorious for microscopic preoccupations, Hobsbawm commanded an 
impressively wide field of subject areas in great detail. This is perhaps one of the reasons 
why his publications ‘Primitive Rebels’ and the subsequent ‘Bandits’, received so much 
criticism, as he is attempting to make far-reaching connections and conclusions between the 
occurrence of brigandry and banditry in all corners of the world. His view was that no matter 
when, where or how banditry made its presence felt, it would always reflect the same 
phenomena –  a symptom of a proletariat revolt.  
Hobsbawm discusses several aspects of social banditry and differentiates between three main 
types of bandits: the noble robber, the primitive resistance fighter, and the terror-bringing 
avenger. Of course, there are different motives amongst them but they all represent a voice 
of popular discontent.31 
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As much as Hobsbawm has been criticised for his categorisation of banditry and those who 
are often viewed as petty criminals, it does at least go some way to breaking up the mass 
labelling of ‘outlaws’ who were incarcerated for their crimes. Understanding the possible 
differences in the perceptions of crime is important to gain a thorough sociological 
understanding of the relationship between citizens and the state. By law, anyone belonging 
to a group of men who attack and rob with violence is a bandit, from those who snatch 
payrolls at an urban street corner to insurgents or ‘freedom fighters’ who happen not to be 
officially recognised as such.32 
Criticising Hobsbawm’s original edition of ‘Bandits’, Anton Blok states that when 
comparing it to Hobsbawm’s original concept of ‘social bandits’, contained in his 1959 
publication of ‘Primitive Rebels’, there is little more on offer than self-fulfilling examples 
that support his hypotheses. In fact, in an attempt to find additional evidence for his theory, 
the author avoids discussing the many cases contradicting them. Blok contends that there is 
much more to banditry than the fact that it may voice popular protest. He believes that even 
though Hobsbawm mentions several other aspects of banditry, his model fails to account for 
these complexities, and even obscures them, because Hobsbawm insists on the interpretation 
of new data in terms of his original model.33 
However, acknowledging the need for the noble bandit as a symbol of hope or a mythological 
tool may help explain why peasants and romanticists indulge in an unrealistic view of the 
rural bandit as an avenger of social injustice, despite clear evidence to the contrary.  
Hobsbawm himself admits that few bandits lived up to the role of popular hero. “Such is the 
need for heroes and champions, that if there are no real ones, unsuitable candidates are 
pressed into service. In real life most Robin Hoods were far from noble.”34 
It seems appropriate to compliment this observation with psychologist Edward Thorndike’s 
description of the Halo effect.35 The Halo effect occurs when we develop a bias in which our 
overall impression of a person colours our judgment of that person’s character and actions. 
If we know (or believe) that a criminal once lived up to the ‘Robin Hood’ standard, we can 
attach that same standard to other criminals and even networks of criminals. Then every 
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action supporting that idealised picture reaffirms our bias and convolutes the reality of their 
actions and whom they are as a person. 
The 'social bandit' as conceptualised and described by Hobsbawm is such a construct, 
stereotype, or figment of human imagination.36 Though such constructs may not match up 
to real-life conditions, they are psychologically real and represent fundamental aspirations 
of people (in this case that of peasants). Successful bandits stand out as men who rose from 
poverty to relative wealth, and who acquired power. 
Hobsbawm states that bandits are defined by their practice of terror and cruelty, it is what 
forms part of their public image. They are heroes not in spite of the fear and horror their 
actions inspire, but in some ways because of them. They are not so much men who right 
wrongs, but avengers, and wielders of power. Revenge and retaliation often go hand-in-hand 
with justice in certain societies particularly where blood calls for blood and bandits often 
appear to live by those ancient codes.37 
Precisely for the same reason, Anton Blok believes that we should instead see bandits as 
aggressive opportunists rather than hold any romantic notions that there is a noble purpose 
to their existence. Blok coined the term ‘violent entrepreneurs’ to counter Hobsbawm’s 
overarching description of those engaged in banditry.38 
Political Marxist thinkers have consistently argued that peasants are reliant upon outside 
leadership in order to change their conditions. Bandits, however, are not instrumental in 
turning peasant anarchy and rebellion into sustained and concerted action on a wider scale. 
Hobsbawm believes this is because their ambitions are modest and that they lack 
organisation and ideology. However, historians such as Blok contend that this is instead due 
to the fact that their first loyalty is to themselves and not to the peasant. 
Hobsbawm writes that ‘social bandits’ such as Robin Hood, Pancho Villa, Ned Kelly, or 
Frank and Jesse James are a unique type of robbers and gangsters. For although they are seen 
as outlaws or criminals by the state, the peasant community regards them as; “heroes, 
champions, avengers, fighters for justice, leaders of liberation, or perhaps just men to be 
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admired, helped and supported.”39 They support them because they fervently defy the state 
against the laws which the lower classes see as injustices or wrongs. 
The peasant society creates him and calls upon him, when it feels the need for a 
champion and protector – but precisely then he is incapable of helping it. For social 
banditry, though a protest, is a modest and unrevolutionary protest. It protests not 
against the fact that peasants are poor and oppressed, but against the fact that they 
are sometimes excessively poor and oppressed.40 
The arguments of Blok and other revisionists that ‘social banditry’ is purely a mythical 
theory is plausible for several reasons. First, the ‘Robin Hood’ story fits in with our moral 
principles and ethical norms. It therefore seems possible that storytellers used an outline 
version of bandit exploits and altered their stories to fit with an idealised image of the noble 
robber, a story that reflects what we wish they had done. Harking back to an idealised past 
can work as a powerful political motivator when wishing to celebrate or demonise the current 
political establishment. Secondly, the bandit is a fascinating and compelling character. 
Bandits break social rules and stand outside the circle of ordinary members of society, 
thereby developing a unique subculture. People like to imagine the adventures of fantastic 
protagonists so they can escape the humdrum of their daily lives. The fact that the hero bandit 
makes for good stories that speak to our moral inclinations is undoubtedly partially 
responsible for its prominence.41 
As Hobsbawm argues, even if the stereotypical ‘Robin Hood’ types never really existed, it 
does not mean that they were not real in people’s minds. Psychologically speaking ‘social 
banditry’ represents a deeper frustration by those subjugated by the ruling elite. The 
criminals who are assigned this ‘pseudo-hero’ or ‘noble’ status, either by the community of 
the time or historians thereafter, become social bandits by proxy. Even if their actions were 
tainted by immorality, the belief that they somehow represented the frustration of the lower 
echelons of society and could ‘stick it to the man’, gave them a moral halo.  
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The Relationship with the State  
The study of banditry or organised crime cannot be fully grasped until one acknowledges 
the importance of the relationship the phenomenon has with the state and its citizens. 
Hobsbawm was not incorrect when he saw bandits as a reflection of the greater peasant 
society. However, the ambiguous position of bandits is much better understood when one 
appreciates the significance of the links that tie the peasant community to the larger society. 
Principally the nobility and the state.42 
Ensuring territorial sovereignty was always a problem in the pre-industrial world. It is easy 
to forget, that before the nineteenth century no province with a territory larger than could be 
walked across in a day or two, possessed enough accurate knowledge to know exactly who 
lived on its territory, was born and died there. No state, before the railways, and the 
telegraphs, ancestors of the modern communications revolution, could know what happened 
in its remoter corners or move its agents rapidly to respond to threats. In fact, to say that any 
state before the nineteenth century could control its borders would be a bit of a stretch. No 
state had the capability to maintain an effective rural police force acting as the direct agent 
of the central government and covering its entire territory.43 
Without the rule of law and governance of the state, the crimes and violence perpetrated by 
bandits wouldn’t take on the same dimensions, nor would there be any glory or justification 
in their endeavours. They would simply be stealing from the common man. When one 
considers the opposite case, where the rule of law and legitimacy of the state is strong, 
banditry struggles to find roots and there is no sense of honour or righteousness in its pursuit. 
However, under a weak state, with limited control and a lack of legitimacy amongst its 
citizens, banditry thrives. The same can be said of a predatory government which is only 
interested in furthering its own members' interests, rather than the overall welfare of the 
people and institutions it presides over. Therefore, it is the strength of the state and the 
public’s respective relationships with power holders that determines the draw, appeal and 
scope of banditry. 
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Take away justice, then, and what are governments but great bandit bands? And after 
all, what are bands of bandits but small states? - St. Augustine of Hippo - The City 
of God vol. IV 44 
Narratives of social justice being pursued by bandits and organised criminal networks are 
especially prevalent when the government is not viewed as a proponent of prosperity and 
security, but rather as an extractive or oppressive force. States which act in a parasitic manner 
toward the population are less likely to garner the support of constituent power bases, unless 
these are ‘cut-in’. Conversely a state can seek to further its own aims by casting bandits or 
criminal networks as public enemies which must be combatted for the common good, 
justifying repressive measures or garnering support for a cause. In reality, both governments 
and organised criminal networks are (by and large) composed of rational actors who will 
most likely act in their own interests, with the audience employed as a resource for both 
sides of the legal divide. However, public approval can often be fickle and easily 
manipulated. 
Research conducted by Haziri in 2003 indicated that overall power holding institutions are 
not viewed positively by a large proportion of the civilian population of Southeast Europe. 
The study found a clear division along ethnic lines, with minority groups, especially ethnic 
Albanians, demonstrating hostility to the police force, the judiciary, armed forces, and 
paramilitary groups.45 
When cast in opposition to a predatory government, bandits and members of criminal 
networks can become folk heroes as, in some cases, they provide spill over benefits to 
ordinary members of society. Bandits are violent, calculating, ruthless, and undiscriminating 
in their exploitation. However, revering them could be logical if they were to help mitigate 
oppression coming from dysfunctional and predatory governments. Bandits can 
unintentionally increase social welfare by diverting government suppression and high taxes, 
as well as providing state services and protection where the government does not. In these 
cases, individuals who support bandits favour a known evil, albeit it the lesser of two evils.46  
This highlights another aspect of the relationship between crime and the state. Neither of 
these two entities can operate in a vacuum, both are dependent on the general populous that 
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are neither civil servant nor criminal. Collectively this amalgamation of people can be 
thought of as fodder for both criminal and state actions. Neither the state nor an effective 
criminal network can act without taking this third factor into account, any strategy engaged 
will affect the wider public. 
Historian Thomas Gallant, in his contribution to bandit studies, has redefined bandits and 
mafia as ‘military entrepreneurs,’ very similar to Blok’s ‘violent entrepreneurs’. Common to 
such groups is the provision of various illegal goods and services, especially the supply of 
‘protection,’ which includes protection from other mafias.47 In some cases, there can be little 
functional difference between the security provided by states and the protection provided by 
bandits. The only marked difference is that states have the right to the monopoly on violence 
on the basis of public legitimacy. Writing about the issue of organised crime in Russia, 
sociologist Vadim Volkov argues that there is little observable difference between illegal 
mafias or brigands that provide protection and the legally sanctioned private security 
agencies (both tend to recruit from the same social pool).48 Anthropologist and Historian 
Steven Sampson argues that for this very reason, from one perspective, the mafia can be seen 
as a type of state and from another it is simply an illegal business. Where the state becomes 
privatised so that it is the instrument of individual enrichment, we might speak of the 
criminalisation of the state.49 
Political scientists Curott and Fink provide an economic explanation for the phenomenon of 
the positive perception of bandits, stating that when bandits provided a valuable service to 
society it was unintentional, merely a consequence of their pursuit for economic gain. They 
agree with Hobsbawm that banditry provides a social function for the least advantaged by 
interfering with elites who benefit from the forceful redistribution of wealth. 
Besides the benefits realised by the bandit, or those who share in the economic gain, the act 
of banditry inspires those in society who wish to see the laws enforced by the state broken 
and the exploitative authority being offended in the process. Even in the absence of 
Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit’ (those who actively right wrongs or with a sense of nobility feel 
associated with the exploited lower classes of society), banditry can provide social benefits. 
Bandits routinely flout inefficient laws, raise the cost of state predation, and in some cases 
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directly provide an alternative to official protection and adjudication services. These tactics, 
which work efficiently for the bandits in terms of economic gain may explain why the knock-
on effects allude to a noble purpose which helps to explain the mystery of its heroic 
depiction.50 If the government is sufficiently exploitative, the welfare gains from banditry 
can become great enough for bandits to acquire a positive reputation. In other words, when 
those in power are ‘bandits’ themselves, ordinary bandits can become heroes. 
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Chapter 2 - Setting the Crime Scene - The Historical 
Development of Modern Albania 
The Hajduks  
When it comes to the history of Balkan bandits, historians and anthropologists such as John 
Koliopoulos and Paul Sant Cassia have criticised Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit’ theory, and 
assert that it does not apply to this breed of bandit. They make particular reference to the 
mercenary role hajduks and klephts played during this period, where Ottoman authorities 
would hire them as irregular soldiers for the suppression of the peasants in defence of the 
state. Sant Cassia observed that Mediterranean bandits; "are often romanticized afterward 
through nationalistic rhetoric and texts which circulate and have a life of their own, giving 
them a permanence and potency which transcends their localized domain and transitory 
nature". 51  In Hobsbawm's case, the romanticising was Marxist/class-based rather than 
nationalistic, yet the fluid, ambiguous figure of the bandit remains. 
Throughout the Ottoman period, Albanians were forced to migrate to find arable land or 
other means of making a living, because population pressure often pushed the limits of what 
their rural homelands could support. In the late eighteenth century food shortages also appear 
to have been a recurring problem. Desperate times call for desperate measures and there are 
evident reasons why banditry became an attractive option (if not one of the only options) to 
rural workers in the region. 
Ottoman Europe suffered turmoil in the late eighteenth century and this truly tested Istanbul's 
hold on provincial authority. Violence and lawlessness go hand-in-hand with frictions and 
tensions within a society, and the larger the state (or Empire) the more difficult it is to control. 
The epidemic of brigandage in the Balkan region points to a much deeper weakness within 
the Ottoman system and perhaps gives an indication as to why the issue accelerated so 
quickly. The Albanian ‘mountain bandits’, hajduks and other outlaw groups were at their 
most prominent during the reign of Selim the Third (r. 1789-1807). The problem of banditry 
affected a considerable area of the Ottoman Balkans and it is the empire’s record’s which 
show that the magnitude of banditry involving Albanians grew through the 1770s and 1780s 
to reach crisis proportions in the 1790s and 1800s. 52  At the same time rival Ottoman 
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Albanian notables became ever more aggressive in their attempts to secure for themselves 
wealth and power. 53 
During this period, the local notables took advantage of the imperial government's 
preoccupation with immediate threats to its own existence, and many Albanians who had no 
secure place to live or work chose to emigrate. Given the lack of viable peaceful 
opportunities next to the opportunity to plunder from chaotic and poorly-defended provinces, 
it is no surprise that so many opted for banditry. For the Ottoman Empire, pressed by severe 
external threats, mounting internal challenges, and suffering a visible loss of domestic 
authority and power, little could be done to quickly repair the damage suffered in the 
Albanian provinces.54 
The most apolitical (or ‘quasi-political movement’) of all bandits in Hobsbawm’s view are 
the Balkan hajduk. They were more removed from sedentary peasant communities, and had 
an established tradition of collective organisation. “Unlike the ‘noble robber’, the hajduk 
does not depend on personal moral approval; unlike the ‘avenger’ his cruelty is not his 
essential characteristic, but tolerated because of his services to the people.”55 
Hobsbawm makes reference to the infamous Albanian bandits of the mountain regions, 
hajduks, and describes them with evident fascination. When discussing the distinctive 
clothing worn by bandits he comments on the strong and elaborate symbolism of the Balkan 
hajduk or klepht, clad in a “gold-and-steel festooned” costume. He states that in all 
traditional and slow-changing societies, even the loose group of the non-conformist poor 
becomes formalised and recognised by outward appearance. “The hajduk’s outfit is a code 
which reads: ‘This man is not tame.’” 56 
In his description, he comments on their reputation for cruelty and ferocity and is careful not 
to wholly connect them to his archetypal ‘social bandit’.  
Unquestionably the hajduk was far more permanently cut off from the peasantry than 
the classical social bandit, not only masterless but also – at least during their bandit 
career – often kinless men (‘without mothers all, and without sisters’), living with the 
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peasantry not so much like Mao’s proverbial fish in water, but rather like soldiers 
who leave their village for the semi-permanent exile of army life.57 
However, he stuck with his contention that the hajduk, just like all other ‘social bandits’ was 
an expression of a political revolt by the peasantry. He believed that the definition of the 
hajduk hero is fundamentally political. In Albania and the rest of the Balkans, they were 
national bandits adhering to certain traditional rules, i.e. a defender or avenger of Christians 
against Turks (despite the fact that many Albanians had already converted to Islam). 
However, this description is again accused of romanticising the position of the bandit within 
Albanian society and indeed as a defender of Christendom against the Muslim Ottomans. 
When looking into the reasons behind this extended rise in brigandage, they are rather less 
elegant or heroic than some theorists of Ottoman banditry would suggest. Sociologist Karen 
Barkey is one who asserted that banditry was an expression of a negotiation between the 
government and provincial groups feeling pressure from a centralising state.58 
Historian Frederick Anscombe contends that there is a distinct lack of evidence that the 
Albanian bandits or hajduks demonstrate the slightest comparison to Eric Hobsbawm’s 
‘social bandit’. The mythology around the Christian hajduks or klephts as ‘national’ proto-
revolutionary figures fighting against an oppressive, alien, Turkish system do not live up to 
the realities of the time. In fact, as far as can be determined, a great majority of the Albanian 
brigands (and their leaders) were Muslim (as were many of the population who had 
converted to Islam during the Ottoman period) and certainly plundered whoever was 
vulnerable, both Muslims and non-Muslims. Rather than motivated by ideology, most simply 
sought marginal profit. Small though the rewards often were, they nevertheless offered an 
escape from the often-dreadful poverty and living conditions found in the brigands’ 
homelands.59 
Anscombe states that when analysing records of the Ottoman Empire, within Albania during 
the 1790s, there was no interest by those operating in brigandry in bargaining for state 
favours. Most brigands showed a clear understanding that the real, immediate rewards were 
to be won by taking advantage of the state's weakness. Those who did try to seize provincial 
offices seem to have been motivated more by the obvious opportunities for immediate 
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enrichment through abuse of office in a time of weak oversight, rather than by a desire to 
gain rewards from the state for service.60 
Perhaps one of the strongest reasons for the rise in banditry was Istanbul's loss of control 
over the provincial authorities in the Balkan region. The administrators in charge of these 
authorities quickly discovered that the government would turn a blind eye to almost any 
unjust act, as long as they continued to send men to serve in the army. Like the bandits 
themselves, the notables took advantage of the state's distractions to seize land, wealth, and 
power. The Ottoman government was not able to re-establish effective control over its 
representatives, and therefore conditions in the Albanian provinces continued to deteriorate, 
meaning poor (yet armed) Albanians would seek to make a living in any way possible 
throughout the reign of Selim the Third.61 
Since the nineteenth century, many nationalist Balkan historians and intellectuals have 
romanticised the role of the klephts and the hajduks so far as to equate them with being the 
bringers of social justice and equality. They described them more as ‘freedom fighters’ who 
were inspired by patriotic and religious sentiments. These bandits were in fact the liberators 
of the Balkan peasantry, who allegedly saw them as the only force capable of protecting local 
freedoms from subversion by the Ottoman government and the indigenous elites.62 
The hero notion of the bandit has had a lot of influence on political discourse throughout the 
Balkans. The bandit or hajduk has been used as a national symbol, capturing modern political 
goals and personifying national movements with the justification of state history. When used 
correctly, this idealised hero can represent both the struggle for freedom and also the strength 
of a nation.63 
Serbian folklorists and historians for example often quote a derogatory comment made by 
Lajos Kossuth a Hungarian patriot who said that Serbs think of themselves as having a nation 
but in reality, they are “nothing but a pack of hajduks”. But the Serbs took this label and 
wore it as a badge of honour since it was such men that helped build the Serbian state.64 
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Historian Andre Gerorymatos argues that, as well as instigating a centuries long challenge 
to law, order, and internal stability, the hajduks left a deep mark on the cultural heritage of 
the Balkan peoples. Banditry, brigandage, and irregular warfare are pivotal elements of 
Balkan folklore and history. Moreover, the bandit ethos became an integral part of state 
building strategies adopted in the nineteenth century by the newly created Balkan countries. 
Gerorymatos believes that the traditions of brigandage and guerrilla warfare had a direct 
impact on the development of the regular armed forces of the Balkan states, as well as 
citizens’ perception of obligatory military service.65 
In the mountainous Balkan region, banditry has a long tradition as a military, social and 
cultural institution. Its history spans from classical antiquity, through the Byzantine era and 
into Ottoman rule, all the while developing and enhancing a symbolic and practical 
repertoire. By the early nineteenth century, the decay of imperial rule propelled bandits into 
the process of nation building – elevating murderers and outlaws to freedom fighters, 
through the process of nationalist historiography.66 
 
The Evolution of the Bandit  
According to criminologist Paul Lunde, "Piracy and banditry were to the preindustrial world 
what organized crime is to modern society”.67 This is true to some extent, as it was the 
transition from feudalism to capitalist and industrial society that changed the nature of 
exploitation and large scale theft. Organised crime is a consequence of capitalism and utilises 
its mechanisms whereas banditry was orchestrated in more of an opportunistic way, targeting 
routes of trade rather than creating trade itself. 
The main problem with the social banditry model is whether-or-not it can be effectively 
proved. The chief criticism of Hobsbawm’s work was that he paid too much attention to 
folksongs and stories when conceptualising his arguments rather than historical fact. 
However, in his defence, given that the ‘high times’ of banditry were in the pre-capitalist 
feudal age, there is little sociological evidence for the historian to work with. Equally, those 
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who contest against his ‘social banditry’ theory argue this was mythological reconstruction 
of a violent social phenomenon provide little evidence themselves to the contrary. 
It therefore makes sense to test the validity of this theory against a modern-day context of 
crime in order to see just how far the same working principles of ‘social banditry’ help 
explain the strength and allure of criminality today. As explained previously, modern day 
organised criminal networks compare well with the model of banditry in the feudalist age. 
The difference between them has been the impact of capitalism and the mass profit to be 
made through tapping global trading markets. There is much more money to be made in 
creating an illegal trade network than stealing from legitimate ones. Although banditry, as 
historians and criminologists may understand it, has long since died, I would argue that the 
same principles of moral justification and sense of righteous purpose come into the 
sociological makeup of modern organised criminal networks as well. As novelist John Barth 
so poignantly put it; “Everyone is necessarily the hero of his own life story”. This will also 
feed into how these criminals are perceived by their relevant audiences, and here the hero 
status and code of honour comes into play. 
Equally the psychological term ‘cognitive dissonance’ is a theory that can be applied to 
understanding the reasons for the number of people who turn to crime. This is the concept 
that refers to the conflict produced by simultaneously holding two sharply opposing ideas or 
by acting in a way that contradicts one’s strongly held beliefs.68 So criminals themselves can 
be fully aware of the immorality of crime and condemn the phenomenon but when it comes 
to any illicit actions that they partake in, they view themselves as merely temporarily taking 
the same actions which criminals take – they do not fall into the category of ‘criminals’. 
They can rationalise their temporary criminal behaviour to being forced into a corner with 
no other options available. Again, this is a product of the justification technique.  
I believe that applying the ‘social bandit’ theory to Albanian organised crime will offer up 
some very interesting findings into its strength and character. I am in no way contending that 
this theoretical method will provide a universal explanation as to the nature and existence of 
Albanian organised crime. However, I believe it will offer some thought-provoking insights 
into the moral complexities of this ‘profession’. 
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The Birth of a State  
When discussing ethnicity with Albanians, most consider themselves descendants of the 
Illyrians, who were the original inhabitants of the western Balkan Peninsula over two 
thousand years ago. While the population of Albania is almost entirely (over 90 per cent) 
‘Albanian,’ they are divided into two major groups, Ghegs and Tosks, according to which 
Albanian dialect they speak. Generally speaking, the Ghegs occupy the northern part of the 
country while the Tosk live in the South.69 Many of those living in Kosovo also consider 
themselves Ghegs and therefore, a lot of the Albanian cultural analysis within this thesis can 
also be applied to the Kosovan experience. It is the Ghegs that have the strongest connection 
to the hajduks, as they inhabited the mountainous regions to the north. 
Although the nation has claim to a long cultural history, in terms of being an independent 
state it is still in its infancy. After falling to Roman authority in 165 BC, modern-day Albania 
remained under the control of various foreign powers until the dawning of the twentieth 
century. After the break-up of the Roman Empire in 395AD, the Byzantine Empire 
established its control over present-day Albania, followed by over 500 years of occupation 
under the Ottoman Empire. This was interrupted only by a brief period in the fifteenth 
century, when an Albanian warrior known as Skanderbeg united his countrymen and fought-
off Turkish rule from 1443-78. He is revered to this day as the national hero of Albania and 
statues, memorials and museums commemorating his memory can be found throughout the 
country. Skanderbeg alongside the ‘fearless’ hajduks has been the source of myth building 
efforts by the Albanian nation. 
During Ottoman occupation, communities in the more inaccessible mountain regions 
remained virtually free of state control, and the inhabitants there preserved their own self-
administration by paying the Albanian nobles fixed tributes to live by the rules of their own 
common law. The law, known as the Doke and later as the Kanun of Lek, remained in 
widespread use till the 1930s. It regulated all aspects of life, including such matters as the 
arrangements of marriages, the boundaries of fields and payment of taxes.70  
In 1912 during the Balkan Wars, Albania achieved its first independence after hundreds of 
years of occupation. However, the outbreak of the First World War saw their independence 
interrupted with parts of the country falling under Italian, Serbian and later Greek 
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occupation. Following their reestablishment of nationhood, the country went through a series 
of internal conflicts culminating in 1928 with the establishment as Albania as a monarchy 
under King Zog. Poor stability and the economic devastation of the Great Depression, 
however, soon led to the overthrow of the King when Mussolini’s Italy invaded in 1939.  
Following the Second World War, during which time both Italy and Germany occupied 
Albania, the country went through a fifty-year period of communism secured by an 
extremely isolationist policy. Led by Enver Hoxha, Albania adhered to a strict Stalinist 
philosophy, alienating many of its fellow communist states (except Maoist China). During 
the Hoxha regime, the Kanun codes, some of which link to the concept of blood feud, were 
strictly prohibited. It was claimed by those in power to have been wiped out, however, 
arguably it had only been suppressed. The blood feud, a system of revenge killing, still 
lingers within northern Albanian society and the Kanun laws survive in popular oral 
tradition.71 
Hoxha's death in 1985 ushered in the gradual fall of communism in Albania and brought 
widespread changes within society. After the collapse of communism, the country was 
submerged in deep conflict as well as political, social and economic turbulences. Political 
pluralism was introduced at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the transition from a 
totalitarian regime to democracy led the nation into the grips of corruption, privatisation 
fraud, protection rackets, violence, and other forms of organised crime. Between 1990 and 
1991 the number of homicides doubled, and armed robberies tripled.72As explained in the 
first chapter, a weak state is the grounds on which ‘social banditry’ can appear.  
New political establishments sought support through ideology that would provide them with 
the national legitimacy they needed to justify their parties’ politics. There was a surge in 
nationalism and a promotion of the pre-socialist past as a source of inspiration. This involved 
the reinforcement of historical myths about Balkan warriors who inspired their countries 
toward prosperity through wars.73 The association of violence as a way of finding one’s lost 
nationality can no doubt have had an influence on the rise of criminal networks. Furthermore, 
citizens would have excused violent behaviour as an expression of the political or national 
                                                          
71 Piotr Smolar, "Ancient Blood Feuds Cast Long Shadow over Hopes for a Modern Albania,"  (2011), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/05/albania-kanun-blood-fueds-smolar. 
72Arsovska, 30. 
73Ibid., 223. 
33 
 
struggle. Whether or not you wish to consider these actors ‘bandits’ of their time, this type 
of action is the hallmark of ‘social banditry’. 
In 1997, the pyramid schemes which the national economy was based upon started to 
collapse like poorly stacked cards. Weak and unprotected financial regulation led to around 
two-thirds of the entire population sinking an estimated US$1.2bn into these schemes. 
Violent protests and demands for then president Sali Berisha to resign erupted into mass 
unrest, bringing the country to the verge of civil war. This can be described as a period of 
great social upheaval, allowing for opportunistic members of society to elbow their way into 
positions of local authority and influence. 
The criminal-political ties that were established during this period had lasting effects on the 
social fabric of the country. For instance, the selling and buying guns was closely linked to 
ethnic pride and national duty. Arms dealers, were often referred to as ‘patriotic bandits’, 
and they proudly supplied the paramilitary organisations in their community with much-
needed weaponry.74 By appealing to patriotic ideals, many arms traffickers managed to win 
the support and respect of the community as their actions were seen as supporting the right 
cause. Weapons thereby became glorified as tools for independence and freedom, whilst also 
becoming symbolic of nationalism and patriotism. 
Extortion rackets also pursued this nationalistic representation. This illicit market found 
fertile ground due to the demand for protection and security, citizens did not trust their 
government nor did they trust one another. So those working in these unofficial ‘security 
groups’ and providing ‘private protection’ often justified their actions by stating they were 
protecting their country’s future. Many of these extortion rackets also had political backing. 
Fundamentally, the social upheaval in Albania and the ongoing crisis in the Balkans allowed 
criminals to don a patriotic mask whilst pursuing their illicit activity.75 
The criminal ties with the political elite that had grown stronger in the mid-1990s and 
culminated in the 1997 collapse of the pyramid savings schemes yielded an estimated US$13 
million in illegal proceeds.76 The deteriorating domestic situation in Albania also resulted in 
the development of smuggling channels and a massive exodus of refugees fleeing economic 
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decline. Around 600,000 Albanians emigrated to Italy and Greece, where they often became 
easy recruits for Albanian speaking organised crime groups.77 
For those who decided to stay or simply couldn’t afford to leave, desperate measures became 
amongst the only options left. The failed pyramid savings schemes wrought anger among 
the population and rebels looted army stockpiles, unleashing a flood of weapons in Albania. 
More than 550,000 guns, 839 million rounds of ammunition, and sixteen million explosive 
devices were looted from army stockpiles during the protests. Some sources estimate that 
the 1997 Albanian pyramid crisis led to one million weapons and 1.5 billion rounds of 
ammunition becoming available on the European black market.78 
Albanian organised criminal groups have risen to prominence due to a plethora of geo-
political and national changes. However, perhaps one of the most significant impacts on their 
development was the Kosovo war and the build up to it in the late 1990s. Supporting ethnic 
Albanians suffering persecution in Kosovo against the Serbs was a notion which most 
Albanians citizens supported and the organised criminal networks were quick to hijack this 
sentiment to suit their own cause. The smuggling operations then took a more patriotic 
flavour and it was much easier to justify illicit activity. There is supporting evidence to show 
that extortion and protection rackets in Albania demanded money for protecting ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo from Serbs.79 In this way, the oppression and violence against ethnic 
Albanian Kosovans played into the nationalist portrayals of bandits or hajduks form an 
earlier era. By serving to provide protection outside the law Albanian organised crime 
networks were able to garner tacit public support, much as did the bandits of the feudalist 
age when they invoked feelings of pride amongst subjugated ethnicities.  
In conjunction, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) expanded, thanks to financing and 
support from the smuggling networks. The interaction and overlap between the two became 
mutually beneficial. The KLA became stronger militarily and had the needed public support 
from most ethnic Albanians, whilst this also paved the way for more extensive drug 
trafficking in the region for the organised criminal networks. In terms of the motives of the 
rebel groups, it was a political grievance – the perceived mistreatment of ethnic Albanians 
in Serbia that motivated popular support and resistance. It was actors with motives of profit 
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who managed to appropriate this cause. One can argue that this occurrence at least helped 
defend the rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, however, the true victors from this 
development can be found in the evidence of the growth of the black market. A study by 
Yannis Papadopoulos revealed that Albanian-Kosovan groups now handle twice the levels 
of heroin that they did before the 1999 war.80 
The various conflicts culminating in the break-up of Yugoslavia lead to the development of 
the black market throughout the region. With strict international embargoes and desperate 
need for supplies, illegitimate trade routes opened up and this strengthened the need for 
criminal networks. Following the war in former Yugoslavia, the countries of Europe began 
to realise how strong the link between organised crime in the Balkans and much of the 
increase crime in Europe was. Some commentators went so far as to call the Dayton 
Agreement - ‘Pax Mafiosa’ and describe NATO's support for the KLA in the Kosovan war 
as allowing the Mafia to guarantee peace.81 
Research conducted in the early 2000's, showed how the so-called Albanian freedom 
organisations in Kosovo and Macedonia were more or less criminal organisations, which in 
principle meant that wars on both sides of the fighting had profound contributions to the 
consolidation of organised crime.82 
A few years after the 1990's war, research showed that Albanian criminals were more 
extensive and better organised than their European rivals. They had come to dominate the 
underworld of the Balkans. For example, the Albanian leagues were the largest exporters of 
heroin to Scandinavia, Poland and Slovakia, and were involved in the heroin market in 
Germany, Switzerland and the United States. In 2005, Albanian criminal networks delivered 
up to half of the heroine to Western Europe. Many ethnic Albanians arrested in Europe for 
crimes involving the subjection of young women into prostitution are actually KLA 
veterans.83 
Doubtless the deterioration of the state in the 1990s, coupled with the growing relationship 
between Albanian authorities and organised crime, fostered the development of a secretive 
society permeated by crime. In this society, being a figure within organised crime did not 
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have an outspoken negative connotation. Government bodies and the public were not 
prepared for these new forms of crime, and therefore they were not officially acknowledged 
by politicians and state representatives. It was only after the fall of communism that Albania 
started to legally recognise different types of crime, particularly human trafficking and drug 
smuggling.84 
The vigilante gangs formed during this period were the precursors of many later criminal 
organisations. Violent groups created, what were essentially, small armies offering protection 
and imposed their influence on Albanian citizens. Methods of extortion, kidnapping, and 
corruption became common place. Vasilika Hysi, a professor at the University of Tirana in 
Albania, argues: “After their collapse (the pyramid schemes), Albanian criminal groups [but 
also common people] became intensively involved in illegal activities and organized crime, 
trying to recover their lost money”.85 
Criminal organisations tend to operate clandestinely, trying to protect their financial or 
business operations by making themselves invisible to law enforcement, as well as the 
competition. However, conflict or major upheaval will often change the environment in 
which organised criminals operate, leading to a far more transparent display of their 
influence and means of operation. This has clear reflections to the workings of ‘social 
banditry.’   
Due to the nation’s history and its geographical location, Albania is a key player on the 
European black market, for crimes ranging from drug trafficking to people smuggling. The 
immediate gains to be made from criminal activity against the backdrop of political 
illegitimacy and a stiflingly weak economy cast a deep shadow on the boundaries between 
‘right and wrong’. Even the normative power of the EU, with the allure of membership, 
struggles to reverse the force of the deeply embedded criminal networks which have rooted 
themselves in the framework of Albanian society. Corruption is critical to the success of all 
illicit business, and unfortunately in Albania it bleeds into so many cracks of everyday life. 
The long presence of corruption in Albania has meant a lack of accountability for criminal 
activity from the lowest to the highest levels. This lack of liability is perhaps best illustrated 
by the nation’s high-level of car theft. During the Hoxha regime, car ownership was reserved 
as a privilege for certain dignitaries, so there were no large-scale car dealerships in operation. 
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Following the fall of the regime, a huge influx of Mercedes appeared in the country, despite 
the fact there was no registered dealership importing the car. There is no record of the precise 
number of individuals accused of theft, because the national law does not register this type 
of criminal activity.86 This can feed into the justification of certain crimes, where theft 
against those ‘who have enough’ is vindicated by the breadth of the persecutors hardship. If 
the justification is a sense of the redistribution of wealth, then one could argue that the ‘Robin 
Hood’ myth mentality comes to the fore here or indeed the condition of cognitive dissonance.  
A clear example of a situation where organised crime networks are openly and directly 
challenging state law is in the case of Lazarat. A municipality in southern Albania close to 
the Greek border, Lazarat was, until recently, known as the cannabis capital of Europe. 
Political determination to deal with the problem was lacking, most likely due to the huge 
amount of revenue the cultivation was reaping and the subsequent power it produced. 
However, one week before a decision on Albania’s candidate status to the EU was made, the 
state took action.87   
In June 2014, 800 police officers were deployed in Lazarat as part of a nationwide operation 
to crack down on cannabis plantations. The authorities seized control of the village after a 
five-day shootout between heavily armed villagers and the police. Thirty suspected cannabis 
growers opened fire with rocket-propelled grenades, heavy mortars and machine guns.88 The 
village had been producing about 900 tons of marijuana per year, worth €4.5 billion (US$ 
4.9 billion) or nearly half of Albania's gross domestic product.89 
The drugs traffickers had used the town as an essential base for their operations and installed 
a form of ‘social control’ on the farmers who lived there. The residents, either by their own 
free will or by coercion, were soon involved with the cultivation of the crop and provided 
storage space (their own houses and sheds) for the drug. It was the political power vacuum, 
that caused Lazarat to descend into this state. Even before the fall of communism the 
municipality was abandoned by the political establishment and allowed to plunge into 
disarray, with no running water, no roads and no law. The community therefore took charge 
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of themselves and over time Lazarat essentially became pariah town. Two local ‘criminal 
entrepreneurs’ brought back cannabis seeds after a trip to Italy in the early 1990s and 
obviously, the financial returns far outweighed the potato growing that was previously their 
main source of revenue. 90  This is a clear example of ‘social banditry’, where a local 
community feels abandoned by the state and individuals acting outside the law provide them 
with a better alternative. 
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Chapter 3 - Social Norms and Justification 
The Role of the Kanun  
The relevance of discussing culture and traditional norms for this research question is 
important as it reveals societal interpretations. However, there are many studies that 
overstate its influence and create a black and white image of a cultural conditioning to crime. 
Not only is this potentially discriminatory but it also obscures the effect of many other 
relevant factors contributing to the draw of the illicit market. Even while merely scratching 
the surface in an analysis of Albania, one finds a manipulation of traditional cultural norms 
by organised crime groups. They take ancient codes such as honour and revenge and use 
them to justify criminal endeavours. 
The principal traditional source which criminal networks have hijacked as their 
‘legitimisation tool’ is the Kanun. The Kanun is a collection of traditional codes complied in 
the fifteenth century. This legal code, attempted to regulate the already existing widespread 
system of vengeance for the sake of honour. It applies specific norms to everyday life and 
specified institutions decide whether there has been a breach of those norms and, if so, 
whether a penalty is warranted. These customary methods have remained in use for centuries 
as a way to settle disputes such as the blood feud and ‘Besa’ (promise or given word), their 
prominence prevails despite the state’s attempts to repeal their legitimacy.91 
As an example, the Kanun decrees that if a man has been grievously insulted, his family has 
the right to assassinate the offender, but in doing so they would consequently be held 
accountable for a revenge killing by the victim’s family. Then the original victim’s nearest 
male relative is obliged to assassinate his relative’s murderer and so on. This vicious cycle 
of revenge killings has passed through generations of Albanian families, causing countless 
deaths. Although the codes are not abided by in the same way today, many assassinations are 
passed off as revenge killings. Many ordinary citizens are finding themselves unable to leave 
their homes for fear of blood feuds which effectively turns their own house into a private 
prison. One reported example is an Albanian national who lost his father and two uncles to 
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a blood feud. Apart from a year or so when he was living in Sweden, he has been confined 
to his home since he was six years old.92 
Homicide rates are alarmingly high in Albania, in fact a recent UNODC report revealed that 
gun-related deaths are almost twice as common as in the U.S and more than 12,000 people 
have died in the country as a result of guns since 1991.93 The fact that weapons are symbolic 
of honour will no doubt have an influence on these figures. Throughout Southeast Europe, 
there is arguably a romantic attachment to weapons as they symbolise courage and male 
honour. Guns are often fired into the air in celebration at weddings or births, and the Kanun 
itself places enormous emphasis on the importance of firearms.94 
However, a thorough research study by criminal law expert Fabian Zhilla, indicated that 
Albanian organised crime does not formally apply any particular legal instruments of the 
Kanun such as ‘Besa’. 95  Nonetheless, criminals frequently justify their crimes on the 
grounds of traditional norms. Zhilla argues that organised crime takes these norms out of 
their social contexts and manipulates them towards criminal ends. 
The same study showed that older generations appear to know the Kanun better and give 
their support to offenders that have committed ‘honour’ crimes more than to perpetrators of 
other types of crime. However, younger generations who only know the laws superficially, 
justify far more crimes as ‘honour-related’, and hold up the Kanun as a shield for their 
actions. In general, ethnic Albanian people have not forgotten the violent mechanisms for 
appropriating ‘justice’ and still account for traditional aspects such as blood feuds, the 
importance of guests, the word of honour (Besa) and the subordination of women. But most 
are not familiar with specific details of the Kanun or have even read the transcribed version 
of it. Therefore, it is not the nature of customary norms like ‘Besa’ and blood feud which 
account for the problem of high homicide rates but the modern ‘interpretation’ by organised 
criminal networks who use them to support their own interests. 
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Another way in which criminals have taken advantage of cultural themes to justify their 
extortion of innocent people is around the importance of hospitality and the guest. For 
example, some ethnic Albanian criminals claim to have been originally dishonoured by the 
bar or shop owners whom they have then gone on to extort. According to the Kanun, the 
‘owner’ of a ‘house’ (in the modern context, a bar or restaurant etc.) must respect the 
demands of his or her guest. If he fails to do so, he has displayed dishonour and blood may 
be taken. The Albanian regard for the guest rises above all other relationships, even ties of 
kinship. The guest and host cultural theme has been exploited by ethnic Albanian criminals 
to extort money from victims, deny the rights of the victim, and to justify criminal actions. 
In order to provoke such circumstances, they themselves will often start an argument to lure 
the ‘owner’ into offending their honour, which will then in turn justify criminal behaviour. 
This neutralisation technique is also used in justifying revenge killings.96 
Furthermore, the Kanun places great importance on the submissive role of women in 
Albanian society, as well as on the masculinity of men. There is a deep patriarchal history 
which lingers within Albanian society today. By this traditional law, women are taught to 
obey their husbands and do not have the same rights to income or ownership. According to 
Arsovska, Albanian criminal networks often use cultural themes to make their arguments 
stronger, and perpetrators frequently deny that their actions are actually ‘criminal’. The 
cultural defence and different neutralisation techniques shows that culture often serves as a 
tool in the hands of the manipulative and innovative offenders. It is also possible to argue 
that elements of the Kanun laws, specifically those regarding the subordination of women, 
are used to justify trafficking-related crimes.97 
However, to blame the ancient Kanun laws on the involvement of Albanians in trafficking 
women for sexual exploitation seems to be a bit of a stretch. It mirrors the attempts of far-
right parties in the West blaming the Koran for Islamic fundamentalism. There are always 
individuals who justify their immoral behaviour on the basis of traditional, religious or 
cultural codes and loosely apply ancient teachings, out of context, into a modern-day setting. 
Understanding these justification techniques is important for revealing the sociological 
nuances or practices of criminal behaviour, however, to claim that ancient laws such as the 
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Kanun are somehow responsible for igniting this type of illegal behaviour dehumanises the 
subjects of study beyond the point of legitimate reasoning. 
The merging of traditional laws with criminal activities makes these networks very secretive 
and difficult to overturn, which obviously works to their benefit. One can then interpret that 
the main reasons for committing various criminal offences are more likely to be connected 
to social upheaval, political/economic dissatisfaction, and poor possibilities for personal gain 
inside the legitimate economy. The Kanun is therefore used as a justification method to 
rationalise this type of behaviour and distract from the harmful consequences of both crime 
and violence.98 
Ethnic Albanian organised crime networks are known to be pursuing criminal activities such 
as the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, extortion, and smuggling illicit firearms. 
It seems that in order to justify these actions, many criminals have used cultural values such 
as valour, mutual aid, and secrecy to rationalise these crimes, distract from the financial 
intent of their actions, and to dehumanise their victims. The work of Arsovska has revealed 
some of the cultural influences behind a number of Albanian criminal activities which can 
help to clarify the intrinsic relationship between the two. For example, according to 
traditional Albanian culture, male honour is closely linked to the possession of firearms and 
the valour in using them. It is considered a dishonour for a man not to possess his own 
weapon, or to have his weapons taken away. 99 Despite the fact that these are ancient laws, 
that do not apply to legitimate state law, they will be used to justify such actions. Whether 
this is a strong enough argument to explain why Albanians get involved in the arms trade in 
the first place is difficult to assess. However, it does work as a justification technique. 
It is important to realise that violent and organised crime amongst ethnic Albanians does not 
have direct origins in a traditional cultural code. That being said, some distinct cultural 
themes have been selectively exploited by Albanian organised criminal networks to justify 
criminal actions, neutralise moral reasoning, keep their membership in check and avoid 
arrest through bribery and corruption. Cherry-picked and modified Kanun codes have served 
as neutralisation mechanisms, helping individuals to continue criminal behaviour and justify 
their actions. However, a peek beneath the surface shows that many of these codes are not 
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rationally applied and some codes are ignored when they do not serve the groups’ best 
interests.100 
Steven Sampson explains what is principally culturally significant for the Balkans, is the 
often-occurring application of ‘alternative social arrangements’ to achieve their own goals 
and to prevent others from achieving theirs. This is the common phenomena of ‘parallel 
structures’ operating throughout Southeast Europe where relatives, client affiliation, family 
ties, social networks and other informal loyalty bands often trump official networks.101 
Sampson argues that while informal social mechanisms in the Balkans are tools which help 
society survive, these same structures also perpetuate conflict and can even start wars. It is 
strong family and social networks which are the roots of social loyalties, but also the roots 
of the kind of bitter conflicts we have seen in the Balkans. The same networks of loyalty 
which make families so ardently supportive may also prevent the emergence of a large sphere 
of public involvement which could combat phenomena such as banditry, mafia, smuggling 
and police corruption. To put it more concretely, the same informal loyalties which help 
groups survive oppression also help to carry out smuggling operations, corrupt police and 
keep members silent. “To celebrate the one is to accept the existence of the other.”102 
Although the concept of ‘blood feuds’ is an ancient one, based on Albania's original code of 
law and honour the sporadic modern application of the Kanun deviates from its original 
context, degenerating from even the specific reasons that were allowable for revenge at 
the height of its influence in the sixteenth century. However, as Albanian society continues 
to modernise, the government strives to demonstrate to all Albanians that justice is best 
served through a strong and competent judicial system rather than vigilante acts. 
 
Modern Myth Making and Glorification  
Just as the hajduks achieved legendary status and were revered as honourable outlaws so too 
have modern organised criminal networks been subject to myth-making. The most definitive 
example being la Cosa Nostra of Sicily, the infamous association of criminals in Southern 
Italy known for their codes of conduct and sense of honour. The American import of this 
group took on their own sense of ‘social banditry’ by hijacking the vastly unpopular 
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prohibition of alcohol and creating an illicit market for spirits for many grateful buyers. 
Despite the changes in state legality and the more violent and deceitful nature of their 
endeavours, this initial glamorisation of the mob stuck. Due to this association of nobility 
and courage, the mafia has been immortalised in Hollywood film and renditions of this 
dangerous yet romanticised type of outlaw is depicted in various films and television series 
to this day (The Sopranos, Peaky Blinders, Goodfellas, Reservoir Dogs etc.). The most 
famous of all, ‘The Godfather’, communicated the idea that mobsters were men who cared 
about the wellbeing of their communities and who lived by their own codes of honour and 
conduct, impervious to the political whims of the establishment. 
Even though these films do not portray the accurate workings of organised crime networks, 
they still leave a lasting impression on both ordinary citizens and the criminals themselves. 
Investigative journalist Roberto Saviano, in his book ‘Gomorrah’ (portraying the Naples 
criminal syndicate ‘Camorra’), claims that there is a fascination with copying the style of 
these Hollywood criminals, such as Scarface (portrayed by Al Pacino), particularly amongst 
the younger generation. Saviano reports of a case of a woman working her way up to the 
higher ranks of the criminal underworld who would, along with her associates, provocatively 
wear yellow type-jumpsuits, associating herself with the same cult figure status as Uma 
Thurman’s character in Tarantino’s film ‘Kill Bill’.103 
Equally some young people in the Balkans seem to be fascinated by the fast and rebellious 
lifestyle of certain organised crime figures. For example, when Alket Rizaj and Vassilis 
Paleokostas used a helicopter to escape from a high-security prison in Greece, many hailed 
them modern day ‘Robin Hoods’, as news reports fuelled their notoriety, saying they offered 
loot to the poor and vowed never to harm members of the public during their thefts.104  
Similarly, the Balkan crime group ‘Pink Panthers’ (their name taken ironically from the Peter 
Sellers film) posted YouTube videos of their notorious robberies of jewellery stores around 
the world and were praised for their ‘amazing work’ on social media. “Respect. You have to 
give it to them,” an ardent fan of the ‘Pink Panthers’ commented on the YouTube video of 
their Dubai robbery. Another blogger added: “Nice job. . .They should be the new cast of 
OCEAN 14.”105 Their recent large scale robbery of celebrity Kim Kardashian’s jewellery 
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(US$11.2 million) was highly commended throughout social media by individuals 
unsympathetic to the victimisation of an ‘unjustly’ rich celebrity.106 
Ethnic Albanians working within organised crime circles in Europe and the US have gained 
an infamous reputation for themselves. Their excessive use of violence, strict codes of 
silence, clan structure and sense of loyalty have made them the archetypal notorious criminal 
to portray. According to this reputation, Albanian crime figures have appeared in a lot of 
recent popular films. They are main characters in films such as ‘Taken’ and ‘Taken II’, 
‘Casino Royale’, ‘The Nest’, ‘Pusher III’, ‘Dossier K’, ‘In with Thieves’, and ‘The Brooklyn 
Connection’.107 They have been perhaps falsely interpreted as the new Sicilian mafia - clan-
based and homogenous with a strong grid like structure. 
Just as the Balkan nationalist historians of the nineteenth century depicted hajduks in a 
positive light (for the purpose of the creation of national identity), so too are modern 
organised criminal networks being both glorified or vilified (depending on the perspective) 
with blinkered descriptions. These simplified, black and white descriptions of what is a 
complicated phenomenon, only serve to support the illusion that one is a bandit by nature, a 
preconditioned outlaw standing up firmly against the ‘system’. It appears that our desire to 
view the world in such a polarised way, mean that the opportunity for ‘social banditry’ is still 
very much alive today.   
One modern example that clearly fits the ‘social banditry’ theory is that of cybercrime. That 
being the moral vindication of hackers or ‘hacktivists’108, individuals or groups who deface 
websites or tap into secret government information and release it online to the general public 
under the principle of ‘freedom of information’. Their actions are illegal but a substantial 
proportion of people believe that there is sometimes a principled act in what they do, that 
the public’s right to know the ‘truth’ about unjust government behaviour justifies defiance 
of legal practice. Wikileaks and the network known as ‘Anonymous’ are prominent examples 
of hacktivism and they present a distinct moral challenge to politics in the digital age. 
Political Scientists Wendy H. Wong and Peter A. Brown refer to these actors as ‘e-bandits’ 
and argue that what makes them fundamentally different to the bandits in Hobsbawm’s 
description of ‘social bandits’ or even the justification myths of the modern ethnic Albanian 
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criminal groups are that they see themselves as ‘stateless actors’. “Using anonymising 
technologies to create a transnational ‘politics of no one’, e-bandits allege to be principled 
actors who capitalise on the Internet and other information technologies to lead disembodied, 
virtual attacks against physical targets in order to encourage political change.”109 
Both Anonymous and WikiLeaks see themselves as taking from the powerful to empower 
the disempowered with information and access to the political process.110 In fact, they are 
more akin to the ‘Robin Hood’ myth than both the bandits of the late eighteenth century and 
modern organised criminal groups as they fight against the injustice of the elite, abstain from 
any violence against civilians and do not operate for personal financial gain. Furthermore, 
particularly with ‘Anonymous’, the covert nature of their operations means that the general 
audience are drawn into a romanticised notion of their personal makeup; that these are 
individuals who care about the ‘common man’. The veneration of hacktivists as vigilantes 
or ‘defenders of justice’ is modern myth making in action.  
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Discussion of Findings  
In a society such as ours where emotions stand against the rational and material 
world, those without wealth are left only with the world of emotions to express their 
hurts, their injustices and their identity.111 
The bandit is someone that the lower classes look to as the champion of their cause and a 
figure to admire because of what he symbolises: resistance, justice and hope. 112  This 
idealisation creates a personality cult and a mythology surrounding the bandit’s actions. 
Though an outlaw, the bandit is seen as a protector of local ethics and represents the larger 
struggle. Social banditry is a particular type of civil society that comes into existence when 
there is a lack of a legitimate local power base. 
Interpretations of Hobsbawm’s take on the ‘social bandit’ often overlook that it is not 
actually a question of whether or not this figure actually existed, it is more the perception 
that the noble thief was there. Rather the emphasis is on understanding this sociological 
phenomenon. If those at the time believed it to be true then in a sense it became true. 
Described by Hobsbawm as a form of social protest, banditry emerges out of periods of 
unstable transition and gives agency to peasant classes who have been left behind by modern 
progress. Throughout the world, the process of state building, has created disenfranchised 
and overlooked classes of peasants that remain on the periphery, striving to assert their power 
in the face of great adversity.113 An expression of this struggle is that of ‘social banditry’. 
Though whatever temporary positive impact social bandits could bring to the lives of 
‘destitute peasants’ in terms of human dignity, the outlaws also bring anti-social and 
detrimental side-affects that run counter to prevailing norms. The same can be observed in a 
contemporary context when we witness organised criminal networks offering alternative 
routes to income and employment to the socially destitute. Although there may initially seem 
to be some benefits for poorer segments of the population, these are all but temporary as 
criminal enterprises have neither the intention nor the capability to further any gradual 
improvement to social equality. Profit margins, control and suppression dictate the direction 
of the illicit market.  
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Social banditry is not attached to any particular social culture, or political order, or, as I have 
argued here, time period. It emerges out of the lower echelons of the social framework as a 
symptom of frustration with the status quo. It is a symbol of struggle against injustice in 
society and an apolitical expression of opposition to the dominant authority.114 It is precisely 
because of the fact that it does not function as a legitimate social movement which could 
overturn the establishment that Hobsbawm describes it as a ‘primitive rebellion’. 
When looking at the Balkan wars of the early 1990s, the Albanian political and economic 
crisis, as well as the Kosovo war, we can see this face of history parallels with the 
vulnerability and susceptibility of earlier transitional periods when social banditry took hold. 
Organised criminal networks emerged out of this period of social upheaval through chance 
events and opportunism. At pivotal moments of transition, the social structure is in a state of 
upheaval and before the cast of the new social order is set, gaps exist which are susceptible 
to criminal opportunists. This is when organised criminal networks establish their hold and 
act as glue that binds the national framework together. This is precisely what happened 
following the fall of the Hoxha regime, leading to the prominence of criminal networks, 
corruption and a reliance on the criminal economy. The most illustrative case of this 
development was that of the cannabis stronghold of Lazarat.  
This is the trend of social banditry – emerging at the fault line of dramatic transitions and 
playing a necessary social role. However, contemporary organised criminal groups are even 
further advanced than the bandits or hajduks of old. As Hobsbawm writes regarding mafias;  
Mafias are both more permanent and powerful, since they are less a series of 
individual revolts and more of an institutionalised system of a law outside the official 
law. In extreme cases, they may amount to a virtual parallel or subsidiary system of 
law and power to that of the official rulers.115 
Organised criminal groups are respected as legitimate power holders because of their ability 
to provide alternate sources of income and employment for their community, even though it 
may be rooted in intimidation tactics and outright attacks on competitors. 
Just like ‘social bandits’ at the time of the hajduks, modern organised criminal networks in 
Albania may be seen as standard-bearers against frustration and protest among the lower 
classes and therefore be construed as the perpetrators of revolt, but importantly they are not 
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revolutionaries in a political sense - one could argue that they are false prophets. The bandits 
of the late eighteenth century, as Hobsbawm argues, were not he harbingers of state upheaval, 
they were apolitical and thus incapable of producing revolutionaries. Whilst organised 
criminal groups of today don’t inspire revolution or a common uprising because they realise 
that they need the state in its present weak condition in order to maintain their own strength 
- like a virus to a host.  
The comparison of Albanian banditry of the late eighteenth century and organised criminal 
networks of today may seem far-fetched. With the arrival of industrialisation and the end of 
feudalism, the criminal landscape changed dramatically and the rules of operation were 
exploited in different ways. However, as discussed previously, the social codes of the Kanun 
act as a cultural line between the two periods of time. No matter how unrepresented these 
codes are today in state law, they still have a significant cultural impact, and as we have seen, 
criminals use them as justification to mask unethical practices. 
The French Annales Historian Fernand Braudel, coined the term ‘Longue Durée’, as a way 
to theoretically describe how abstract concepts such as human behaviour could be connected 
over extended periods of time with a sense of consistency.116 These concepts may outlive or 
intersect, more definitive episodes of time such as the rise and fall of an empire or 
philosophical movements such as the Enlightenment. Yet historians can often, perhaps 
unbeknown to themselves, slip into analysing sociological or political movements within the 
context of generalised eras of history established by classical thinkers, which may indeed act 
as a limitation on their findings. The ‘Longue Durée’ postulates that there are abstract 
cultural codes which linger over greater periods of time despite economic and political 
changes. The theory may be an appropriate tool to use in the case of Albania which has 
shown a sluggish movement away from adhering to ancient cultural codes that do not sit 
well within a modern democratic European environment; A mentality that has been allowed 
to fester thanks to the recent turbulent history of this state and its Balkan neighbours.  
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Conclusion  
Despite the controversy, Hobsbawm’s theory of ‘social bandits’ proves to be an insightful 
tool when discussing the role criminality can play within society, even in a modern setting. 
Of course, the literal concept of highway bands stealing from trade carts has all but 
disappeared and this Marxist theory is not mirroring the lower echelons of Albanian society 
as demonstrating the same behaviours of the proletariat of a feudalist age. However, the fact 
that criminal figures can act behind false cloaks of justice and retribution and often become 
venerated by ordinary members of society because of it, is still very much present.  
There appears to be more evidence of seeing modern ethnic Albanian criminals as, Blok 
contended, ‘violent entrepreneurs’, rather than the definition of Hobsbawm’s ‘social bandit’. 
However, acknowledging the need for the noble bandit as a symbol of hope or a mythological 
tool may help explain why they can achieve such a strong and untouchable status. A status 
which occasionally leads to them garnering public support as fighters against social injustice 
or as indicated with Albanians during the Kosovo conflict – defenders of ethnic survival.  
I believe that this model could be applied to many other states where organised crime is 
present as a way of understanding, not only the workings of the criminal networks 
themselves but the integral relationship between the state and its citizens. It could also 
deepen the understanding of the connection between organised crime and terrorism, as we 
often see the two forces working in tandem. There have been recent papers which have taken 
this modern application of Hobsbawm’s theory. Ivan Manokha has analysed social banditry 
in the context of Al Qaeda117 and social scientist Joel Pruce has used the theory as a way to 
understand the workings of both the Sicilian Mafia and Hezbollah.118 
A very interesting study could be to apply the social banditry theory to the phenomenon of 
ISIS (Daesh). Although one could argue that this movement challenges Hobsbawm’s claim 
to ‘social bandits’ being non-revolutionary, the movement does reflect the same principles 
of a group acting outside the law and utilising illicit networks to strengthen their cause. 
Despite the terror and fear that the movement brings, it still attracts followers and supporters 
who may see the movement as a popular uprising of those unrepresented in the world in 
which they live. Their members also utilise the same myth-making and justification 
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techniques practiced by bandits during the feudal age and the example given of modern 
ethnic Albanian criminal networks. In addition, the comparison of social banditry to 
hacktivists or ‘e-banditry’ offers up a lot of promise for future academic research. 
The theoretical lens of ‘social banditry’ of course has its limitations and understanding the 
real intricacies of the strength of ethnic Albanian modern organised crime networks, requires 
a nuanced approach that analyses an array of political and economic influences. However, 
Hobsbawm’s theory does offer unique sociological insights into the integral relationship 
between the state and its citizens as well as elements of moral justification (or cognitive 
dissonance) which cloak the reality of criminal activity. The important learning point from 
this study is that cultural codes such as the Kanun do not encourage violence but criminals 
manage to manipulate them to justify their behaviour.  
The ‘social banditry’ theory also lends itself well to a humanist perspective, an approach 
sorely needed in a world that increasingly frames complex social issues in black and white 
through fast and easily digestible media platforms. It may indeed help our international 
approach towards Albania if we understand the strength of criminality amongst this ethnicity 
as not a cultural conditioning but as a ‘primitive rebellion’ that indicates a frustration of their 
current political and economic situation.  
Even if real life social bandits don’t exist, the psychological effect of this myth can have far 
reaching consequences when it comes to the methods and impact of criminal behaviour. It 
would therefore be wise to take this into account when encouraging political and social 
reforms in a nation looking towards EU accession.  
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